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ci.2013.0Abstract The proxy signature, a variant of the ordinary digital signature, has been an active
research topic in recent years; it has many useful applications, including distributed systems and
grid computing. Although many identity-based proxy signature schemes have been proposed in
the literature, only a few proposals for identity-based strong designated veriﬁer proxy signature
(ID-SDVPS) schemes are available. However, it has been found that most of the ID-SDVPS
schemes that have been proposed to date are not efﬁcient in terms of computation and security,
and a computationally efﬁcient and secured ID-SDVPS scheme using elliptic curve bilinear pairing
has been proposed in this paper. The security of the scheme is mainly based on the hardness
assumption of CDH and GBDH problems in the random oracle model, which is existentially
unforgeable against different types of adversaries. Furthermore, the security of our scheme is sim-
ulated in the AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) soft-
ware, a widely used automated internet protocol validation tool, and the simulation results conﬁrm
strong security against both active and passive attacks. In addition, because of a high processing
capability and supporting additional security features, the scheme is suitable for the environments
in which less computational cost with strong security is required.
ª 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University.1. Introduction
In a PKI (public key infrastructure)-based cryptosystem, the
public key certiﬁcate that is generated and signed by a certiﬁ-
cate authority (CA) is required for authentication of the public
keys of the entities, and, as a result, it creates a heavy
management burden for maintaining and using the public
key certiﬁcate by developing a global infrastructure. As a rem-
edy, Shamir (1984) proposed the concept of an identity-based8797369160; fax: +91 326
, haﬁzul.ism@gmail.com (SK
ng by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of K
3.004cryptosystem (IBC) that supports the users’ authentication
through the use of a public identity. In other words, a user’s
public key in IBC is computed from an email identity, a social
security number, a passport number or other identiﬁers and a
private key generator (PKG); a trusted third party generates
the user’s private key by using the user’s identity and his/her
master private key. The private key generated by PKG is com-
municated to the user through a secure channel, for which its
legitimacy can be veriﬁed by the user publicly. However, as
such, no practical implementation for IBC was proposed by
Shamir, and in 2001, Boneh and Franklin (2001) ﬁrst proposed
a bilinear pairing-based technique (Weil or Tate) that uses a
super-singular elliptic curve based on the Bilinear Difﬁeing Saud University.
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(Bellare and Rogaway, 1993), which is called the identity-
based encryption (IBE) technique. Subsequently, a number
of IBE cryptosystems have been developed. In this paper, we
have proposed an identity-based strong designated veriﬁer
proxy signature (ID-SDVPS) scheme that uses bilinear pairing
for mapping from an elliptic curve additive cyclic group
(Miller, 1985; Koblitz, 1987) to any multiplicative cyclic group
of the same prime order. Next, the description of some signa-
ture schemes will be given.
In 1996, Jakobsson et al. (1996) ﬁrst proposed a designated
veriﬁer signature (DVS) scheme for which the original signer
Alice generates a signature, and only a designated veriﬁer
Bob can verify the signature. However, it can be seen that
the signer’s privacy protection is violated in DVS schemes be-
cause Bob can easily convince a third party that the message
was signed by Alice. To remove this problem, Jakobsson
et al. (1996) proposed another signature scheme, called the
strong designated veriﬁer signature (SDVS). In an SDVS
scheme (Huang et al., 2008; Kang et al., 2009; Islam and
Biswas, 2013), Bob cannot prove to an outsider that Alice is
the original signer. This problem occurs because an identical
signature can be generated by Bob, and it cannot be distin-
guished from the signatures of Alice; in addition, Bob’s private
key is strictly required in the veriﬁcation phase. Therefore, the
SDVS scheme satisﬁes the strongness and repudiable proper-
ties. Since then, many SDVS schemes (Saeednia et al., 2004;
Huang et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2011; Yoon,
2011) have been proposed by researchers for different applica-
tions of Network/Information Security.
In 1996, Mambo et al. (1996) proposed a proxy signature
scheme in which the original signer (Alice) delegated his sign-
ing privilege to a proxy signer such that the proxy signer
(Bob) on behalf of the original signer can sign some speciﬁc
messages. An entity (Cindy) who receives a message with a
proxy signature can easily check the correctness of the signa-
ture and be convinced about the agreement of the original
signer. However, this proxy signature scheme allows public
veriﬁcation, which might not be suitable for applications in
which the veriﬁcation of the proxy signature for personal sen-
sitive and/or important commercial documents must be per-
formed by designated persons. Thus, a strong designated
veriﬁer proxy signature (SDVPS) scheme (Dai et al., 2003;
Wang, 2004; Cao et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2011) is proposed
for these environments. In this scheme, the proxy signer com-
putes a proxy signature for the designated veriﬁer, who only
validates the signature but is unable to convince an outsider
about the original signer and the proxy signer. The reason is
that the designated veriﬁer can also generate a simulated proxy
signature that is intended for him, which is indistinguishable
from the original proxy signature.
Proxy signatures have been suggested for many applica-
tions, including distributed systems (Neuman, 1993), grid com-
puting (Foster et al., 1998), mobile agent systems (Kim et al.,
2001), mobile communications (Park and Lee, 2001), and e-
commerce (Dai et al., 2003; Wang, 2004). Based on the appli-
cation areas, the proxy signature can be categorized into four
types (Mambo et al., 1996; Wang, 2008; Yang, 2010; Islam and
Biswas, 2012a), namely full delegation, partial delegation, dele-
gation by warrant and partial delegation by warrant. Among
these, the partial delegation by warrant satisﬁes all the security
requirements of the proxy signatures. Additionally, the proxysignature is based on the proxy private key; the proxy signa-
tures can be classiﬁed into two signature types, which are
proxy-unprotected and proxy-protected. There is a repudiation
dispute problem in the proxy-unprotected scheme because the
proxy signature is created either by the original signer or the
proxy signer. On the other hand, the repudiation dispute prob-
lem is absent in the proxy-protected scheme because only the
proxy signer generates the proxy signature.
1.1. Recent studies
A number of new identity-based strong designated veriﬁer
proxy signature (ID-SDVPS) schemes have been proposed re-
cently (Cao et al., 2005; Lal and Verma, 2006; Kang et al.,
2009; Lee et al., 2010), and a short discussion of each is pro-
vided here. In 2003, Dai et al. (2003) proposed a designated
veriﬁer proxy signature (DVPS) scheme that is suitable for e-
commerce environments. In 2005, Cao et al. (2005) proposed
an identity-based DVPS (ID-DVPS) scheme that is based on
Cha and Cheon’s signature scheme (Cha and Cheon, 2003)
and uses bilinear pairing, and Gu and Zhu (2005) proposed
a new computational model for a provably secure identity-
based proxy signature scheme. In 2006, Lal and Verma
(2006) proposed an ID-DVPS scheme using bilinear pairings.
However, Kang et al. (2009) proved that the scheme was inse-
cure; then, they proposed an efﬁcient scheme and claimed that
the scheme was unforgeable. Later, in 2008, Gu and Zhu
(2008) proposed an efﬁcient version of Zhang and Kim’s
scheme (2003), which was based on the security model pro-
posed in (Gu and Zhu, 2005). In 2010, Lee et al. (2010) dem-
onstrated that the scheme proposed in (Kang et al., 2009) is
universally forgeable, which means that anyone can forge a va-
lid ID-DVPS on an arbitrary message without the knowledge
of the secret key of either the signer or the designated veriﬁer.
A new proxy signature scheme was also proposed by Wu
et al. (2007), which improves the security aspects of an iden-
tity-based proxy signature scheme. Wang (2008) gave a new
identity-based proxy signature scheme, which is secure against
the proxy key exposure attack in the random oracle model
(Bellare and Rogaway, 1993). In general, an ID-DVPS scheme
needs a trusted PKG unconditionally; otherwise, a dishonest
PKG can compute the private key of any user and can forge
its proxy signature. In 2010, Yang et al., as a solution of the
problem, proposed an ID-DVPS scheme without a trusted
party. Later on, Reddy et al. (2010) also proposed an iden-
tity-based directed proxy signature scheme using bilinear pair-
ings and the concept of Hess’s identity-based signature scheme
(Hess, 2002). In 2012, Islam and Biswas (2012a) proposed an
efﬁcient ID-based Short DVPS (ID-ShDVPS) scheme using
elliptic curve bilinear pairing, which is a short signature
scheme and is applicable to the environments with limited
bandwidth, computing power and storage space. However, it
always generates the same proxy signature on the same mes-
sage, and its security is proven only heuristically.
1.2. Our contributions
Elliptic curve cryptography and bilinear pairing are two efﬁ-
cient tools that are used to design secure cryptographic proto-
cols for various applications (Zhang and Kim, 2003; Dai et al.,
2003; Cao et al., 2005; Farash et al., 2012; Das, 2012). In the
literature, many ID-SDVPS schemes using elliptic curve
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coming of these schemes is the involvement of high computa-
tional cost because many bilinear pairing and pairing-based
exponentiation operations are executed for their implementa-
tion. Moreover, the security of most of the previous schemes
is argued only heuristically; thus, these schemes are prone to
security attacks against active adversaries. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to design a provably secure and computationally efﬁ-
cient ID-SDVPS scheme, and in this paper, we proposed
such a scheme by using elliptic curve bilinear pairing, where
it combines the idea of ID-SDVS schemes proposed in (Huang
et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2010; Yoon, 2011). The schemes (Huang
et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2010) are known to be provably secured,
i.e., the schemes are existentially unforgeable under the adap-
tive chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle
model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993), based on the intractabil-
ity of GBDH and BDH assumptions, respectively. However,
the main shortcoming of the scheme (Huang et al., 2008) is
that it always produces the same signature on the same mes-
sage. On the other hand, Yoon’s ID-SDVS scheme (2011) is
efﬁcient with respect to the computations and the communica-
tions; however, it is not proven to be provably secured in the
random oracle model. Moreover, our scheme has been ana-
lyzed using the random oracle model, and it has been found
that the scheme is to be existentially unforgeable against adap-
tively chosen message and identity attacks based on the hard-
ness assumption of CDH and GBDH assumptions. In
addition, we have implemented our proposed ID-SDVPS
scheme in the AVISPA software (AVISPA, 2005, 2013), which
is a strong simulation tool that is used for the automated secu-
rity analysis of cryptographic protocols and for formal security
veriﬁcation, and the results obtained through simulation prove
it to be strongly secure against active and passive attacks.
Additionally, it is computationally efﬁcient because a smaller
number of bilinear pairings is involved, and it satisﬁes all the
necessary security requirements.
1.3. Organization of the paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes some preliminaries that are required in the paper.
Section 3 illustrates our ID-SDVPS scheme, and the provable
security analysis and formal veriﬁcation of the scheme are ad-
dressed in Section 4. The comparison of our scheme with other
schemes is given in Section 5 and the Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we brieﬂy review the concepts of elliptic curve
bilinear pairing, some relevant computational problems, the
computational model deﬁnition and the security properties
of an ID-SDVPS scheme.
2.1. Bilinear pairings
Let Gq be an additive cyclic group with the prime order q(P2k,
where k is a security parameter), and let Gm be another multi-
plicative group of the same order q. In addition, let
e^ : Gq  Gq ! Gm be a bilinear mapping with the following
properties: Bilinearity: e^ðaP ; bQÞ ¼ e^ðP ;QÞab for all P, Q 2 Gq and
a; b2RZq.
 Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q 2 Gq such that
e^ðP ;QÞ – 1m, where 1m is an identity element of Gm.
 Computability: There is an efﬁcient algorithm that can efﬁ-
ciently compute e^ðP ;QÞ for all P, Q 2 Gq.
Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman Parameter Generator (BDHPG): A
BDHPG G is deﬁned as a probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithm that takes the security parameter k as input and outputs
a uniformly random tuple ðq; e^;Gq;Gm;PÞ of bilinear
parameters.
2.2. Complexity assumptions
In this section, we deﬁned some computational problems on
the elliptic curve group and bilinear pairings. Several crypto-
graphic schemes have been proposed that are mainly based
on the hardness of the following problems, which are assumed
to be computationally intractable by any polynomial time
bounded algorithm.
 Computational Difﬁe–Hellman (CDH) Problem: For any
a; b2RZq, given (P, aP, bP) belongs to Gq, compute abP.
 Decisional Difﬁe–Hellman (DDH) Problem: For any
a; b; c2RZq, given (P, aP, bP, cP) belongs to Gq, decide
whether c= abmod q holds.
 Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman (BDH) Problem: For any
a; b; c2RZq, given (P, aP, bP, cP) belongs to Gq, compute
e^ðP ; P Þabc.
 Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman (BDH) Assumption: If G is a BDH
parameter generator, the advantage AdvBDHG;C ðkÞ of an algo-
rithm C for solving the BDH problem is deﬁned to be the
probability that the algorithm C outputs e^ðP ; PÞabc from
the input (Gq, Gm, e, P, aP, bP, cP), where (Gq, Gm, e) are
the outputs of G for a sufﬁciently large security parameter
k, (P, aP, bP,cP) 2 Gq and a; b; c2RZq. The BDH assump-
tion is that the advantage AdvBDHG;C ðkÞ is negligible for all
the efﬁcient algorithms C.
 Decisional Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman (DBDH) Problem: Given
a randomly chosen P 2 Gq and (aP, bP, cP) 2 Gq, where
a; b; c2RZq and g 2 Gm, decide whether g ¼ e^ðP ; P Þabc holds.
 Gap Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman (GBDH) Problem: Given a
randomly chosen P 2 Gq as well as (aP, bP, cP) 2 Gq for
any a; b; c2RZq, compute e^ðP ; P Þabc with the help of the
DBDH oracle.
2.3. Deﬁnition of an ID-SDVPS scheme
In general, an ID-SDVPS scheme comprises four entities, such
as the PKG, the original signer, the proxy signer and a desig-
nated veriﬁer. The participating entities and their roles in the
ID-SDVPS scheme are deﬁned as follows:
 Private Key Generator (PKG): The PKG is a trusted author-
ity who is responsible for setting up the system’s parameter
and generating the private key for all the entities that exist
in the system.
 Original signer: The original signer ﬁrst deﬁnes a warrant
and then delegates his signing capability to a proxy signer.
(d)
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key that is based on the original signer’s warrant and dele-
gation information. He then signs some messages for the
designated veriﬁer on behalf of the original signer.
 Designated veriﬁer: The designated veriﬁer checks the cor-
rectness of the received proxy signature according to the pre-
deﬁned verifying equation and then convince himself about
the agreement of the original signer on the signed message.
An ID-SDVPS scheme comprises the following algorithms:
 Setup: It takes a security parameter k 2 Z+ as input and
outputs the system’s parameter X and a pair of master pri-
vate/public key (msk, mpk).
 Extract: It takes a security parameter k, a system parameter
X and the master private key msk as input, and it outputs
the valid private/public key pair (Si, Qi) for an entity IDi.
 DGen: On input of the system’s parameter X, the original
signer’s private key Si and a warrant mw, the DGen algo-
rithm outputs a valid delegationW for the proxy signer IDj.
 DVerify: It takes the original signer’s public key Qi and a
delegation W as input and outputs accept if W is valid;
otherwise, it outputs reject.
 PKGen: Given the proxy signer’s private key Sj and a dele-
gation W, it outputs a valid proxy private/public key pair
(SP, QP).
 PSGen: It takes the proxy private key SP, the delegationW,
the designated veriﬁer’s public key Qk and a signed message
m 2 {0,1}* as input and generates a proxy signature r for
the designated veriﬁer IDk.
 PSVerify: This algorithm accepts a message m 2 {0,1}*, a
warrant W, a signature r, the public key pair (Qi, Qj) of
the original signer and the proxy signer, the designated ver-
iﬁer’s private key Sk and returns accept if the signature r is
valid; otherwise, it returns reject.
 Transcript simulation: This algorithm takes a message
m 2 {0,1}*, a warrant W and the designated veriﬁer’s pri-
vate key Sk to generate a simulated proxy signature r 0,
which is identical to the original designated veriﬁer proxy
signature r that was generated by the proxy signer.
2.4. Security properties of an ID-SDVPS scheme
The ID-SDVPS scheme is expected to satisfy distinguishability,
strong veriﬁability, strong undeniability, strong identiﬁability,
prevention of misuse and strong unforgeability security proper-
ties, which are brieﬂy given below:
 Distinguishability: The designated veriﬁer can distinguish
the proxy signature from the original signer’s normal signa-
ture easily.
 Strong veriﬁability: The designated veriﬁer is convinced of
the agreement of the original signer on the signed message.
 Strong undeniability: Once the proxy signer generates a valid
proxy signature on behalf of the original signer, however, he
cannot deny the signature generation at the later time.
 Strong identiﬁability: The identities of the original signer
and the proxy signer can be determined by anyone from
the proxy signature. Prevention of misuse: The proxy private key cannot be used
to sign any message, i.e., the proxy signer can sign only
those messages that have been approved by the original
signer.
 Strong unforgeability: The original signer and other third
parties, except for the designated veriﬁer, cannot generate
a valid proxy signature without the proxy private key or
the designated veriﬁer’s private key.
3. The proposed ID-SDVPS scheme
In this section, the description of our proposed ID-SDVPS
scheme is given. In our scheme, it is assumed that Alice is
the original signer and has the identity IDA, Bob is the proxy
signer and has the identity IDB and Cindy is the designated ver-
iﬁer and has the identity IDC. We denote them as IDi, where
i 2 {A, B, C}, and we consider (Qi, Si) to be their public/private
key pair. As stated earlier, the ideas of the schemes (Huang
et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2010; Yoon, 2011) are combined in this
paper to construct a new ID-SDVPS scheme that has strong
security in the random oracle model and less computational
cost, which is described as follows:
 Setup: Given a security parameter k 2 Z+, the PKG does
the following:
(a) Choose an additive cyclic group (Gq,+) of prime
order q, a multiplicative group (Gm, Æ) of the same
order q and an admissible bilinear map
e^ : Gq  Gq ! Gm.
(b) Choose a number s2RZq and a generator P of Gq, and
then compute Ppub = sP, where (msk, mpk) = (s, sP)
is a master private/public key pair of PKG.
(c) Choose three secure and one-way cryptographic hash
functions, which are deﬁned as H1:{0,1}
*ﬁ Gq,
H 2 : f0; 1g  Gq ! Zq and
H 3 : f0; 1g  Gm ! Zq.
Publish the system’s parameter X ¼ fGq;Gm; e^;
q; P ; Ppub;H 1;H 2;H 3g while keeping the master private
key msk= s secret. Extract: Given an identity IDi, PKG does the following:
(a) Compute a private key Si = sQi and send it to the
user IDi through a secure channel, where the user’s
public key Qi = H1 (IDi) is easily computed from IDi
by anyone. Note that the hash function H1 is called
the Map-To-Point function, and it converts a random
string IDi to an elliptic curve point Qi of the group Gq
(Boneh and Franklin, 2001; Islam and Biswas, 2012b).
(b) Accordingly, Alice, Bob and Cindy obtain their key
pairs (SA, QA),(SB, QB) and (SC, QC) from PKG.
 DGen: The original signer Alice creates a warrant mw that
keeps the record of the identities of Alice and Bob, the types
of messages that Bob can sign, the proxy validity period and
so on. Then,Alice chooses a number x2RZq and generates the
delegation that is based on the signature proposed in (Sun
et al., 2010), as follows:
(a) ComputeR= xP and h=H2(mw,R), wheremw andR
are concatenated before applying the hash functionH2.
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(c) Output (R, V) as a delegation on the warrant mw and
send it to Bob for veriﬁcation and proxy key
generation. DVerify: Given a delegation (R, V), Alice’s identity IDA and
the public key QA, Bob does the following:
(a) Computes h=H2(mw, R).
(b) Checks whether the equation e^ðV ; P Þ ¼
e^ðRþ hQA; PpubÞ holds. If so, Bob accepts the delega-
tion (R, V); otherwise, he rejects it.
 PKGen: After validating the delegation (R, V), Bob gener-
ates the proxy private/public key pair with the help of
Alice’s delegation and his private key SB, as follows:
(a) The proxy private key is computed as SP = V+ hSB.
Note that
SP ¼Vþ hSB
¼xPpub þ hSA þ hSB
¼xsPþ hðsQA þ sQBÞ
¼s½xPþ hðQA þQBÞ
¼s½Rþ hðQA þQBÞ
¼sQP
(b) Then, the proxy public key can be computed as
QP = R+ h(QA + QB).
 PSGen: To generate a valid strong designated veriﬁer proxy
signature on a given message m 2 {0,1}*, Bob computes the
message according to the ID-SDVS schemes proposed in
(Huang et al., 2008; Yoon, 2011), as follows:
(a) Choose a number r2RZq and compute T ¼ e^ðSP ;QCÞr.
(b) Compute r= H3(m, mw, T).
(c) Then, send the proxy signature (mw, m, R, r, r) to
Cindy for veriﬁcation.
 PSVerify: To accept or reject the proxy signature (mw, m, R,
r, r), Cindy executes the following operations:
(a) Check that the type of message m is the same as de-
ﬁned in the mw; continue if the message and the wa-
rrant are valid and correspond to each other; reject
otherwise.
(b) Compute QP = R+ h(QA + QB) and
T ¼ e^ðrQP ; SCÞ.
(c) Compute r ¼ H 3ðm;mw; T Þ.
(d) Accept the proxy signature (mw, m, R, r, r) if r ¼ r
holds; otherwise, reject it.
 Transcript simulation: For a given message m 2 {0,1}*,
Cindy uses his/her secret key SC to generate a valid simu-
lated designated veriﬁer proxy signature, as given below:
(a) Choose a number y^2RZq and compute bT ¼
e^ðy^QP ; SCÞ.
(b) Compute r^ ¼ H 3ðm;mw; bT Þ.
(c) Then, the simulated signature ðmw;m;R; y^; r^Þ is a v-
alid designated veriﬁer proxy signature, and it can
be easily veriﬁed by the veriﬁcation equation r ¼ r.
The proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is further illustrated in
Figure 1.4. Analysis of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme
In this section, we ﬁrst check the correctness of the proposed
ID-SDVPS scheme, and then, we analyze the scheme formally,
using the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993)
and the AVISPA tool (AVISPA, 2005, 2013).
4.1. Correctness of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme
The correctness of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is as
follows:
(a) Given R= xP, h=H2(mw, R) and V= xPpub + hSA,
the delegation (R, V) is valid because we have
e^ðRþ hQA;PpubÞ
¼ e^ðxPþ hQA; sPÞ
¼ e^ðxsPþ hsQA;PÞ
¼ e^ðxPpub þ hSA;PÞ
¼ e^ðV;PÞ
Therefore, the proxy private and public keys SP =
V+ hSB = sQP and QP = R+ h(QA + QB) are also valid.
(b) The proxy signature (mw, m, R, r, r) is also correct and
consistent because we obtain
T ¼e^ðrQP;SCÞ
¼e^ðQP;SCÞr
¼e^ðRþ hðQA þQBÞ;SCÞr
¼e^ðxPþ hðQA þQBÞ; sQCÞr
¼e^ðsxPþ shðQA þQBÞ;QCÞr
¼e^ðxPpub þ hðSA þ SBÞ;QCÞr
¼e^ðxPpub þ hSB þ hSA;QCÞr
¼e^ðxPpub þ hSA þ hSB;QCÞr
¼e^ðVþ hSB;QCÞr
¼e^ðSP;QCÞr
¼T
Thus, we can have r ¼ H3ðm;mw;TÞ ¼ H3ðm;mw;TÞ ¼ r,
and hence, the correctness of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme
is proved.
4.2. Security analysis
In this section, we prove that the proposed scheme satisﬁes all
the security properties of an ID-SDVPS scheme, as deﬁned in
(Lee et al., 2001; Cha and Cheon, 2003; Wu et al., 2007; Lin
et al., 2011). We consider the random oracle model (Bellare
and Rogaway, 1993) and show that the proposed ID-SDVPS
scheme is strongly unforgeable against all types of adversaries.
 Distinguishability: The proxy signatures generated by the
proxy signer are distinguishable by everyone of the normal
signatures of the proxy signer. Because the normal signa-
ture generated by Bob for Cindy can be veriﬁed only by
Bob’s public key and Cindy’s private key, in our proposed
scheme, Cindy uses his private key and Bob’s proxy public
key to verify the validity of the proxy signature (mw, m,
R, r, r). Note that the proxy public key (QP) is computed
Figure 1 The proposed ID-SDVPS scheme.
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parameters. Therefore, the veriﬁcation process of a proxy
signature and a normal signature are not identical. Hence,
Cindy can distinguish the normal signature from the proxy
signature easily.
 Strong veriﬁability: The designated veriﬁer Cindy is con-
vinced about the agreement of Alice on the signed message.
Now, the received proxy signature (mw, m, R, r, r) is valid
if the equation r ¼ r holds. To verify this proxy signature,
Cindy computes QP ¼ Rþ hðQA þ QBÞ; T ¼ e^ðrQP ; SCÞ and
r ¼ H 3ðm;mw; T Þ, which show the requirement of the war-
rant mw. Thus, Cindy can ﬁnd Alice’s identity from the war-
rant mw, and Alice’s agreement on the signed message is
directly understood by Cindy. Strong undeniability: On behalf of Alice, Bob generates a
valid proxy signature for Cindy; however the signature
generation at the later time cannot be denied by Bob. In
our scheme, Bob generates the proxy signature (mw, m,
R, r, r) for Cindy, where, r=H3(m, mw, T) and
T ¼ e^ðSP ;QCÞr, and this signature can be veriﬁed by using
the veriﬁcation equation r ¼ r, where T ¼ e^ðrQP ; SCÞ and
r ¼ H 3ðm;mw; T Þ. Because the ﬁnal veriﬁcation of the
proxy signature requires Cindy’s private key and Bob’s
proxy public key, this in turn proves that the signature
was created by Bob because he can only compute the
proxy signature by using his proxy private key SP, which
was created by his private key and Alice’s delegation
information.
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identity of the corresponding proxy signer from a valid
proxy signature. In our scheme, the delegation information
(R, V) is generated by Alice from the warrant mw, which
speciﬁes the identities of Alice and Bob, the types of mes-
sages that Bob can sign, the validity period and more.
Therefore, Cindy, from the warrantmw, can determine the
identity of Bob directly.
 Prevention of misuse: The proxy private key cannot be used
to sign other messages; those messages are not authorized
by the original signer. In our scheme, Bob cannot sign
any messages that have not been authorized by Alice. For
this reason, Alice generates a warrant mw that retains the
necessary records of the proxy information, such as the
identities of Alice and Bob, the restrictions on the messages
that Bob can sign, a validity period for the delegation of the
signing power and more items of relevance. Therefore, if
Bob signs other messages that have not been authorized
by Alice, Cindy can detect this action easily by checking
the warrant mw. Hence, the property prevention of misuse
is achieved in our scheme.
 Strong unforgeability: On behalf of the original signer, the
proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature for the des-
ignated veriﬁer, but a proxy signature cannot be generated
by the original signer and other third parties, except for the
designated veriﬁer. This situation occurs because the out-
sider does not know either the proxy private key or the pri-
vate key of the designated veriﬁer. Before discussing the
strong unforgeability of our proxy signature scheme in the
random oracle model, we ﬁrst addressed the following types
of adversaries that could exist in the system:
(a) Type I: The adversary knows only the public keys of
Alice and Bob.
(b) Type II: The adversary knows only the public keys of
Alice and Bob and also knows the private key of Bob.
(c) Type III: The adversary knows only the public keys
of Alice and Bob and also knows the private key of
Alice.From the above, we can say that, if the proxy signature
scheme is unforgeable against Type II and III adversaries, it
is also unforgeable against a Type I adversary.
4.2.1. Unforgeability against a Type II adversary
Theorem 1. If there exists a probabilistic polynomial time
bounded Type II adversary AII who can break our proposed ID-
SDVPS scheme under the adaptively chosen message and
identity attacks in the random oracle model, then there exists
an algorithm C that can be used by AII to solve the CDH problem
in the elliptic curve group.
Proof. The Type II adversary AII knows the public keys of
Alice and Bob and also knows the private key of Bob. The
unforgeability of the proposed proxy signature scheme against
Type II adversary AII requires that it is difﬁcult to generate a
valid delegation without Alice’s private key. If AII generates a
valid delegation, then he can compute the valid proxy private
key easily and a valid strong designated veriﬁer proxy signa-
ture as well. We can show that, if there exists an AII who
can forge a valid delegation of our scheme, then there exists
an algorithm C to solve an instance of the CDH problem.Thus, C can compute abP for a given random instance (P,
aP, bP) 2 Gq, where a; b2RZq. To solve the CDH problem, C
sets (msk, mpk) = (a, aP), Bob’s private/public key (SB,
PB) = (acP, cP) and gives (SB, PB) to AII. Here, P is a gener-
ator of Gq, and {H1, H2, H3} is considered to be a random ora-
cle. Then, C generates the system’s parameter X by running the
Setup algorithm and sends it to AII. Next, C answers AII’s que-
ries in the following way:
H1 queries: C maintains a list LH1 to record the hash queries
and the corresponding output. When AII submits a query on
IDi to the oracle H1, then C looks into LH1 and responds as
Qi ¼ H1ðIDiÞ ¼
bP for i ¼ A
riP otherwise; ri 2R Zq
( )
Extract queries: When AII issues an Extract query on IDi, C
ﬁrst makes a query on IDi to the oracle H1 and recovers Qi
from the LH1list. Then, C replies to AII as follows:
Si ¼
? for i ¼ A
riaP otherwise
 
H2 queries: Suppose that AII submits an H2 query on (mw, Ri),
C searches the list LH2 and returns the previous value if such a
value is found in LH2; otherwise, C selects an hi2RZq, outputs
it as the answer and adds (mw, Ri, hi) to LH2.
DGen queries: On receiving a DGen query on the warrant
mw with the original signer’s identity IDi, C ﬁrst recovers the
values (IDi, Qi) and (mw, Ri, hi) from LH1 and LH2,
respectively, and then performs the following:
(a) If IDi „ IDA, then C computes the private key Si = riaP,
chooses xi2RZq and computes the delegation as
(i) Ri = xiP.
(ii) Vi = xiPpub + hiSi.(b) Otherwise, quit the protocol.
Finally, C returns (Ri, Vi) as the delegation on mw, with the
original signer’s identity IDi.
DVerify queries: On receiving a DVerify query (Ri, Vi) on
mw with the original signer’s identity IDi, C recovers (IDi, Qi)
and (mw, Ri, hi) from LH1 and LH2, respectively, and performs
the following:
(a) If IDi = IDA holds, then C aborts.
(b) Otherwise, C veriﬁes the correctness of the delegation
(Ri, Vi) with the equation e^ðV i; P Þ ¼ e^ðRi þ hiQi; PpubÞ and
then outputs the result. Note that the delegation (Ri, Vi)
is valid if IDi and mw have never been queried during the
Extract and DGen oracles, respectively.
Finally, AII outputs ðRi ;Vi Þ with hi * on mw as a valid
delegation with the original signer’s identity IDi. Based on the
forking lemma (Pointcheval and Stern, 2000), C recovers
another tuple mw;R

i ; h

i
 
from the list LH2 and then replays
the random oracle with the same random tape, but with
different choices of the hash value of H2. In other words, on
the same warrant mw, C obtains another forged delegation
Ri ;Vi
 
with hi such that h

i – hi and V

i – Vi. Finally, C has
two valid delegations Ri ;V

i
 
and Ri ;Vi
 
on the same
warrant mw. Therefore, the verifying equations e^ V

i ;P
  ¼
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  ¼ e^ a Ri þ hi bP ;P  and e^ðVi;PÞ ¼
e^ Ri þ hibP; aP
  ¼ e^ a Ri þ hibP ;P  hold; in other words,
we have Vi ¼ a Ri þ hi bP
 
and Vi ¼ a Ri þ hibP
 
. Then, C
can solve the CDH problem with the instance (P, aP, bP), as
follows: Vi  Vi ¼ hi  hi
 
abP and abP ¼ Vi  Vi
 
hi  hi
 1
. h4.2.2. Unforgeability against a Type III adversary
Theorem 2. The proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is existentially
unforgeable against the adaptive chosen message and the identity
adversary AIII of Type III provided by the GBDH problem is
intractable in the elliptic curve group.
Proof. The Type III adversary AIII knows the public keys of
Alice and Bob and also knows the private key of Alice. There-
fore, AIII can generate a valid delegation, but not a valid proxy
private key because he does not know Bob’s private key. Thus,
AIII attempts to generate a valid proxy signature without the
proxy private key or the private key of Cindy. We now show
that, if AIII can generate a forged proxy signature, then there
must exist an algorithm C that can use AIII to solve an instance
of a GBDH problem.Thus, for a given random instance (P,
aP, bP, cP) 2 Gq, where a; b; c2RZq, C can compete e^ðP;PÞabc
with the help of the DBDH oracle. To solve a GBDH problem,
C sets (msk, mpk) = (a, aP), SA = aa0P, QA = a0P, QB = aP
and QC = bP, and sends (QA, QB, QC, QP, SA) to AIII, where
a0; a; b; c 2 RZq. Next, C generates the system’s parameter X
by running the Setup algorithm and sends it to AIII and
answers AIII’s queries, as follows:Figure 2 ArchitectureH1 queries: In this case, AIII can ask at most qH1 times H1
hash queries, and C maintains a list LH1 to record the hash
queries and the corresponding outputs. When AIII submits a
query IDi to the oracle H1, then C looks into the list LH1 and
responds as follows:
Qi ¼ H1ðIDiÞ ¼
a0P for i ¼ A
bP for i ¼ B
cP for i ¼ C
riP otherwise ri2R Zq
8>>><>>>:
9>>>=>>>;
Extract queries: In this case, AIII can ask at most qe Extract
queries. When AIII submits an Extract query on IDi, C recovers
the tuple (IDi, Qi) from LH1 and then responds as follows:
Si ¼
? for i ¼ A;B;C
riaP otherwise
 
H2 queries: In this case, AIII can ask at most qH2 times H2 hash
queries. When receiving an H2 query on (mw, Ri), C ﬁrst
searches the list LH2 and returns the old value deﬁned in
LH2 if such a value is found. Otherwise, C selects hi2RZq, sets
H2(mw, Ri) = hi and includes the tuple (mw, Ri, hi) into the list
LH2.
DGen queries: In this case, AIII can ask at most qd times
DGen queries. Assume that AIII makes a DGen query to C on
the warrant mw with the original signer’s identity IDi. Here, C
knows the original signer’s private/public key pair (SA = aa
0P,
QA = a
0P), and then C executes DGen queries on (IDi, mw) to
compute the corresponding delegation (Ri, Vi).of the AVISPA tool.
Figure 3 Role speciﬁcation of the original signer (Alice) in
HLPSL language.
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signer for mw, C computes the private key Sj= rjaP of the
proxy signer, the proxy private key SPj = Vi + hiSj and A
responds to AIII with SPj.
H3 queries: The adversary AIII is allowed to ask at most qH3
times H3 hash queries, and C maintains an H3 oracle list LH3
that contains the tuples of the form (mi, ti, ri, coini). Here,
(mi, ti) and ri are the input and output, respectively. Next, if
ti  e^ðVi þ hiSj;QkÞ1=hi  e^ðVi;QkÞ1=hi ¼ e^ðP;PÞabc holds, then
coini = 1; otherwise, coini = 0. On receiving an H3 query on
(mi, ti), C submits ðti  e^ðViþ hiSj;QkÞ1=hi  e^ðVi;QkÞ1=hi ;
aP; bP; cPÞ to the DBDH oracle, which informs C whether
ti  e^ðViþ hiSj;QkÞ1=hi  e^ðVi;QkÞ1=hi ¼ e^ðP;PÞabc holds and
performs the following:
(a) If ti  e^ðV i þ hiSj;QkÞ1=hi  e^ðV i;QkÞ1=hi ¼ e^ðP ; P Þabc
holds, then C sets coini = 1 and looks into the list LH3
and produces the following:
(i) If a tuple of the form (mi, ^, ri,1) is found in LH3,
then C outputs ri.
(ii) Otherwise, C chooses ri2RZq such that there is no
tuple of the form (Æ, Æ, ri, Æ) in LH3 and inserts (mi,
ti, ri,1) into LH3 and returns ri as the output.(b) If ti  e^ðV i þ hiSj;QkÞ1=hi  e^ðV i;QkÞ1=hi – e^ðP ; P Þabc, then C sets
coini = 0 and chooses ri2RZq such that there is no tuple of
the form (Æ, Æ, ri, Æ) in the list LH3; then, C inserts (mi, ti, ri, 0)
into LH3 and returns ri as the output.
PSGen queries: The adversary AIII is allowed to ask at most
qs times PSGen queries. Suppose that AIII selects a message mi
and then submits a PSGen query to C on mi. Then, C performs
the following:
(a) If the tuple (mi, ti, ri,1) is found in LH3, then C returns ri as the
proxy signature.
(b) Otherwise, C chooses ri2RZq such that there is no item
(Æ, Æ, ri, Æ) in LH3. Then, C adds (mi, ^, ri,1) into the list LH3
and returns ri as the output.
Thus, AIII gets ri as the proxy signature for the message mi.
PSVerify queries: In this case, AIII can ask at most qv times
PSVerify queries. When receiving a PSVerify query on (mi, ri),
C searches the list LH3 and answers AIII’s query as follows:
(a) If there is no tuple of the form (Æ, Æ, ri, Æ) in LH3, then C rejects
the signature ri.
(b) Otherwise, there is an item (Æ, Æ, ri, Æ) in the list LH3, and the con-
clusion is as follows:(i) If the item has the form (mi, ^, ri,1) or (mi, ti, ri,1), then
C accepts the signature ri as a valid signature.
(ii) Otherwise, C rejects the signature ri.Therefore, (mi, ri) is a valid proxy signature provided that
ri has never been queried by the oracle H3. At the end of this
game, AIII outputs a valid forged proxy signature (m*, r*),
while m* has never been queried to the PSGen oracle, and C
returns r* asH3(m
*, t*), i.e., we conclude that (m*, t*, r*,1) is in
the LH3 list and t
  e^ðVi þ hiSj;QkÞ1=hi  e^ðVi;QkÞ1=hi ¼
e^ðP;PÞabc holds. Thus, for a given random instance (P, aP,
bP, cP) belongs to Gq where a; b; c2RZq, C solves the GBDH
problem by computing e^ðP;PÞabc with the help of the DBDH
oracle. h4.3. Formal security validation using the AVISPA tool
Recently, the automated security validation tool for internet
protocols and its applications have become widely employed
in many cryptographic protocols, to analyze security systems
formally. In the literature, many such tools have been found,
and AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Pro-
tocols and Applications) (Oheimb, 2005; AVISPA, 2013) is one
of the commonly used automated security validation tools
(Farashei al., 2012; Basu et al., 2012; Das, 2012; Das et al.,
2013). AVISPA is a push-button tool that was developed based
on the Dolev-Yao intruder model (Dolev and Yao, 1983) for
the automated validation of cryptographic protocols. In this
model, an intruder has full control over the network, i.e., all
the messages sent by principals go to the intruder, who can for-
ward, modify, replay, suppress and synthesize them and can
send them anywhere. In addition, an intruder can play the
roles of the legitimate principals and can gain knowledge of
the compromised principals; however, he cannot break the
cryptography. The AVISPA tool has a modular and expressive
formal language, called HLPSL (High Level Protocol
Figure 4 Role speciﬁcation of the proxy signer (Bob) in HLPSL language.
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protocols and analysis of various security properties such as
secrecy of keys, authentication, freshness and robustness
against replay attacks. In addition, the AVISPA tool supports
four back-ends/model checkers (See Figure 2), namely OFMC
(On-the-ﬂy Model-Checker), CL-AtSe (Constraint-Logic-
based Attack Searcher), SATMC (SAT-based Model-Checker)
and TA4SP (Tree Automata-based Protocol Analyzer) (AVI-
SPA, 2005), each of which is brieﬂy described below:
 OFMC: This back-end builds the inﬁnite tree deﬁned by the proto-
col analysis problem and executes different symbolic techniques to
search the state space in a demand-driven way, i.e., on-the-ﬂy.
OFMC helps to detect attacks and verify the correctness of the pro-
tocol for a bounded number of sessions, but without limiting the
number of messages that an intruder can generate.
 CL-AtSe: This back-end is used to detect the attacks on the proto-
col by using a set of constraints that are obtained by translating the
security protocol speciﬁcation written in Intermediate Format (IF).
The detection of attacks and the translation of protocol speciﬁca-tions, which are designed based on the adversary’s knowledge,
are fully automated and are internally performed by the CL-AtSe
model checker.
 SATMC: This back end is used to explore the state space through
several symbolic techniques. Note that it also detects attacks on
protocols and validates the security requirements by using a
bounded number of sessions.
 TA4SP: Based on the propositional formulae and regular tree lan-
guages, this back-end approximates the intruder knowledge (over
or under), using the unbounded number of sessions.
To analyze a cryptographic protocol with the AVISPA
tool, the following steps must be executed:
Step 1. The protocol is to be coded in the HLPSL speciﬁcation,
which is a role-based language that helps to describe each partici-
pant’s role and the composition roles for the representation of
the scenarios of the basic roles.
Step 2. Using the translator HLPSL2IF, the HLPSL code is to be
translated into IF, which contains some information about IF syn-
tax for back-ends, the description of mathematical properties of
Figure 5 Role speciﬁcation of the designated veriﬁer (Cindy) in
HLPSL language.
Figure 6 Results of the formal security analysis of the proposed
scheme using OFMC back-end.
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der’s behavior.
Step 3. Finally, the IF speciﬁcation is given to the back-ends of the
AVISPA tool to analyze whether there are any active or passive
attacks.
To validate and examine the security properties of our ID-
SDVPS scheme, we implemented it using the HLPSL language
in the AVISPA tool, and the role speciﬁcations of the original
signer (Alice), the proxy signer (Bob) and the designated veri-
ﬁer (Cindy) are given in Figs. 3–5. We have simulated our
scheme using SPAN (Security Protocol ANimator) for AVI-
SPA. The proposed scheme is analyzed in the OFMC and
CL-AtSe back-ends, and the results are shown in Figs. 6 and
7. From these simulation results, the proposed ID-SDVPS
scheme indeed shows its strong security assurance against both
passive and active attacks.
5. Efﬁciency analysis
In this section, we compare the efﬁciency of the proposed
scheme with other schemes that were proposed in (Cao et al.,
2005; Kang et al., 2009; Yang, 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Reddy
et al., 2010). In our comparison, the following three time com-
plexities for the different computations mentioned are used.
 TEM: Time complexity for executing an elliptic curve scalar point
multiplication.
 TBP:Time complexity for executing a bilinear pairing operation.
 TPX: Time complexity for executing a pairing-based
exponentiation.
To generate the proxy signature, the proxy signer com-
putes T ¼ e^ðSP;QCÞ a priori, and hence, the time complexi-Figure 7 Results of the formal security analysis of the proposed
scheme using CL-AtSe back-end.
Table 1 Comparison of the proposed scheme with other schemes.
Scheme Cao et al. (2005) Lee et al. (2010) Kang et al. (2009) Yang (2010) Reddy et al. (2010) Proposed
DGen 2TEM 2TBP + 2TEM+ 1TPX 1TBP + 2TEM 2TEM 1TPX + 2TEM 3TEM
DVerify 2TBP + 1TEM 2TBP + 1TEM 1TBP 3TBP + 1TPX 2TBP + 1TPX 2TBP + 1TEM
PKGen 2TEM – – 1TEM 1TEM 1TEM
PSGen 1TBP + 1TPX
+ 3TEM
2TBP + 3TEM+ 1TPX 1TBP + 3TEM 2TBP + 2TPX + 2TEM 2TBP + 1TPX + 4TEM 1TPX
PSVerify 3TBP + 2TEM 3TBP + 1TEM 2TBP 5TBP + 4TPX 3TBP + 1TPX + 1TEM 1TBP + 1TEM
Total 6TBP + 1TPX
+ 10TEM
7TBP + 7TEM+ 2TPX 5TBP + 5TEM 8TBP + 7TPX + 5TEM 7TBP + 4TPX + 8TEM 3TBP + 1TPX + 6TEM
Length 4ŒGqŒ 3ŒGqŒ 3ŒGqŒ ŒZq*Œ+ 3ŒGqŒ 2ŒZq*Œ+ 3ŒGqŒ 2ŒZq*Œ+ ŒGqŒ
Security Heuristic Provable Heuristic Heuristic Heuristic Provable
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tion of six elliptic curve scalar point multiplications, three
bilinear pairings and one pairing-based exponentiation oper-
ation. In Table 1, we compare the efﬁciency of the proposed
scheme with other schemes based on the computation cost,
the communication cost (length of the signature) and the
security, which show that our scheme is more computation
and communication efﬁcient than others (Cao et al., 2005;
Kang et al., 2009; Yang, 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Reddy
et al., 2010). In addition, it has been found that the pro-
posed scheme is unforgeable against active and passive at-
tacks and is provably secure under the adaptively chosen
message and identity attacks in the random oracle model
based on CDH and GBDH assumptions.6. Conclusions
Recently, elliptic curve cryptography and bilinear pairing have
been extensively used to design different secure and efﬁcient
schemes for a variety of applications. Several ID-SDVPS
schemes based on elliptic curve bilinear pairing have been pro-
posed in recent years; however, they are neither secure against
different attacks nor computationally efﬁcient. In this paper,
we proposed an efﬁcient ID-SDVPS scheme, which is demon-
strated to be provably secure with the hardness assumption of
CDH and GBDH problems in the random oracle model
against an adaptive chosen message and identity attacks under
the different types of adversaries. Additionally, the formal val-
idation of the proposed ID-SDVPS scheme is performed by
using an automated validation tool called AVISPA, and the
simulation results show that the scheme is unforgeable against
active and passive adversaries. Compared with other existing
schemes, the proposed scheme also provides better computa-
tion and communication efﬁciencies and, thus, is suitable for
real-life applications.Acknowledgments
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